Volition as an important component of the psychological element of crime is one of the important issues of criminal law, whose role in the realization of criminal responsibility has different dimensions and has always been the solution of debates and opinions. In this article, an attempt has been made to examine the role of volition in criminal responsibility from the perspective of Iranian and French jurisprudence and law. The current article is descriptive and analytical and has investigated the mentioned question by using the library method. The findings indicate that both in Iranian jurisprudence and French law, although material behavior is necessary for the realization of criminal responsibility, it is not sufficient and it is necessary that this behavior is done with free volition. Therefore, if the perpetrator does not have the volition to carry out that behavior, no type of criminal responsibility volition be realized. In fact, the basis of criminal responsibility is the volition of the behavior. If a person does not have the right to freely choose his own behavior, which means that he lacks freedom of volition or there is no opportunity for him to choose his behavior, then he cannot be held criminally responsible. In Iranian jurisprudence and law, lack of volition in cases such as coercion, reluctance, sleep and anesthesia is a civil liability. In French law, coercion in a way that is out of tolerance, as well as drunkenness and any mental disorder that destroys the volition, are responsible for blasphemy. Of course, in both Iranian and French laws, in cases such as drunkenness, the removal of responsibility does not mean the removal of compensation, and the perpetrator must compensate the damage caused to the victim.