In intentional murder, the killer does not have any authority in determining and choosing the punishment of retribution or unconditional pardon, but does he have any authority regarding the determination of bloodmoney, or does he have the right to make a decision and express an opinion in the process of converting qisas into bloodmoney? The majority of jurists, except in special cases that require the payment of excess money or the death of the murderer while fleeing, are of the latter theory and this theory is reflected in Article 359 of the Islamic Penal Code, but it seems that despite the fame of the jurist, by re-reading the jurisprudential arguments and especially the arguments which have been neglected by the majority of jurisprudents until now, we can criticize the opinion of the famous jurist and invalidate the consent of the murderer in converting retribution into bloodmoney. In this regard, this article seeks to prove the "theory of imposition of bloodmoney on him" in intentional murder with a comparative reading of the theory of the killer's discretion in accepting or not accepting bloodmoney. Therefore, this writing is looking for a new reading of the role of the killer's consent in turning retribution into bloodmoney, citing authentic legal sources and valid jurisprudential-legal ideas. The result of proving the killer's lack of consent in this category is to solve the conflicts of the articles of the Islamic Penal Code in the context of the heterogeneity of the effect of the killer's consent in the process of converting retribution into money, harmony with the Shariah's taste in encouraging forgiveness while maintaining the deterrent feature of criminal reactions, non-revocation of Muslim blood, etc.