Criminal responsibility based on free will and autonomy constitutes one of the fundamental principles of classical criminal law, rooted in moral philosophy and anthropology. This traditional perspective emphasizes an absolute dichotomy between full responsibility and complete lack of responsibility, thereby disregarding the possibility of intermediate degrees of liability, particularly in cases of unintentional crimes. However, psychological, social, and neurological realities demonstrate that in many crime-generating situations, human will and autonomy are not entirely absent but are significantly weakened by various factors such as psychological pressures, structural constraints, or individual limitations. Using a descriptive-analytical method and adopting an interdisciplinary approach between criminal law and criminology, this article explores the feasibility of reconciling criminal responsibility with the concept of “diminished autonomy” in unintentional offenses. Within this framework, several challenges are examined, including the definition and precise application of the “reasonable person” standard, neglect of individual differences, the difficulty of assessing levels of autonomy in negligent behavior, and the influence of unconscious or unpredictable factors on the offender’s conduct. In response, new approaches are proposed, such as the “individualization of fault standards,” an emphasis on the “foreseeability and avoid ability” of risks by the offender, reliance on “evidence-based approaches” for analyzing the conditions of the offense, the promotion of “public education” to enhance awareness of responsibility, and the “assessment of specific circumstances” to recommend alternative penal responses.