The transformation of contemporary economic and industrial activities and the prominent role of legal persons (corporations and other legal entities) in causing environmental damage have made the need to revise the individual-centered approach of criminal law more evident than ever. This study, conducted using a descriptive–analytical method, aims to explain the jurisprudential (fiqh) and legal foundations of the criminal liability of legal persons for environmental crimes in Iran’s legal system. The findings indicate that general fiqh rules such as *“no harm” (lā ḍarar)*, *causation (tasbīb)*, and the prohibition of *corruption on earth (ifsād fī al-arḍ)* have a strong capacity to justify attributing liability to legal/constructive entities and are compatible with modern foundations of criminal law. Nevertheless, despite the legislator’s positive step in Article 143 of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, ambiguity in concepts such as “organizational will” and weaknesses in judicial practice have reduced the effectiveness of this institution in confronting systemic negligence. A comparative examination of French law also highlights the need to move from requiring proof of an “explicit managerial order” toward recognizing “structural negligence” as an expression of organizational will, along with diversifying restorative sanctions. Ultimately, this research concludes that, to achieve genuine deterrence, Iran’s legal system requires transformation in judicial practice and a broader interpretation of attribution criteria so that—while maintaining consistency with fiqh principles—the criminal liability of legal persons can be elevated from a merely formal status to an effective tool for protecting environmental public order.