This study aims to explain the legal effects and rules of Haq Allah (the right of God) and Haq al-Nas (the right of people) in diyah and ta’zir punishments and to clarify the role of this distinction in prosecution, forgiveness, and the enforcement of punishment. The importance of this research arises from the fact that although Iranian criminal laws explicitly refer to the concepts of Haq Allah and Haq al-Nas, the practical consequences of this distinction at different stages of criminal proceedings have often remained ambiguous and, in some cases, have led to varying interpretations in judicial practice. The research method is descriptive–analytical and is based on the examination of Iranian criminal laws, particularly the Islamic Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Through analyzing the legal mechanisms and the legal nature of these two categories of rights, the study seeks to identify both the differences and the points of connection between diyah and ta’zir punishments. The findings indicate that diyah is largely based on the aspect of Haq al-Nas, where the will of the victim plays a central role in initiating prosecution, granting forgiveness, and influencing the enforcement of the judgment. In contrast, ta’zir punishments involve a combination of private and public aspects, and in many cases the necessity of maintaining public order limits the role of the victim and strengthens the authority of the state. The results show that the distinction between Haq Allah and Haq al-Nas directly affects the structure of criminal proceedings, and clarifying its criteria can contribute to greater coherence in the rules governing prosecution, forgiveness, and the execution of punishments, as well as to the promotion of criminal justice.