Climate change is no longer merely an environmental or managerial issue; rather, certain human behaviors that contribute to its intensification, due to their widespread and intergenerational risks, are capable of being analyzed within the framework of criminal responsibility. This study aims to examine whether the jurisprudential principles of La Darar (no harm), Itlaf (destruction), and Tasbib (causation) can provide a theoretical foundation for the criminalization of climate harmful conduct and for the determination of discretionary criminal sanctions (ta’zir). The research adopts a descriptive–analytical method, drawing upon sources of Imami jurisprudence and environmental criminology, and seeks to reinterpret the functions of these principles in order to clarify their capacity to address emerging climate related crimes. The findings indicate that the principle of La Darar establishes the basis for prohibiting harm and safeguarding the public interest; the rule of Itlaf, in cases of direct destruction of natural resources, supports liability and the aggravation of responsibility; and the doctrine of Tasbib constitutes the most significant jurisprudential tool for attributing gradual, cumulative, and delayed climate harms to human conduct. The combined effect of these three principles, together with the foundations of preserving social order and protecting public rights, provides sufficient grounds for justifying discretionary criminal liability in climate crimes. Accordingly, the appropriate criminal policy in this field should be proportionate, restorative, and preventive, focusing not only on deterrence but also on compensation for damage and the reform of high risk behaviors.