Network-based economic disruptions often result from a combination of coordinated conduct, organizational division of roles, and the cumulative effects of acts, none of which, taken individually, may produce a severe economic consequence. This characteristic poses a significant challenge in attributing the result constituting ifsad (corruption on earth) to members, accomplices, and leaders of the network, since establishing large-scale economic harm or its connection to the network’s overall activities does not necessarily establish the hadd liability of each individual perpetrator. This study seeks to develop a jurisprudential–criminal standard for attributing the result of ifsad in network-based economic disruptions and to assess the capacity of Article 286 of the Islamic Penal Code in this regard. The research employs a descriptive–analytical method based on the study of Imami jurisprudential sources, criminal laws, selected published judicial decisions, and legal scholarship. The findings indicate that Article 286 has a result-oriented structure and that the establishment of economic ifsad requires the concurrence of widespread conduct, a severe and statutorily prescribed consequence, a causal relationship, and an individualized mental element. Based on the jurisprudential doctrines of direct causation (mubasharat), indirect causation (tasbib), concurrence of causes, and the predominance of the stronger cause, physical perpetration is not the exclusive basis of liability; accordingly, a designer or director who creates or controls the mechanism effectively producing the prohibited result may also be held responsible. Nevertheless, mere membership, complicity, benefit, or leadership does not substitute for proof of the perpetrator’s causal contribution and knowledge. The analytical model proposed in this study consists of identifying the legally prescribed result, reconstructing the causal network, establishing the individual’s effective participation in the common risk, assessing organizational control and awareness, examining intervening causes, and applying jurisprudential and evidentiary safeguards. The study concludes that a defensible standard is “individualized attribution based on customary causation and effective participation in a common risk.” This standard makes it possible to hold concealed designers and organizers of a network accountable while preventing the automatic attribution of large-scale consequences to marginal or uninformed members and clearly distinguishing hadd liability from ta'zir liability. In cases of ifsad fi al-ard, mere initial doubt, without sufficient efforts to obtain and assess evidence, is not sufficient; however, if, after judicial examination, any element of the offense or any condition of the accused’s individual criminal liability cannot be established pursuant to Article 120, extending the hadd offense to such a case would not be permissible.