This research examines the legal arguments and defenses in the case of South Africa v. Israel before the International Court of Justice, in light of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The central question focuses on the strength of the evidence presented to establish a violation of the Convention and the validity of the opposing substantive and procedural defenses. The study employs a descriptive-analytical approach, comparing the positions of both parties, the text of the Convention, judicial precedents, and official documents published up to October 7, 2026. It demonstrates that proving acts such as killing and the imposition of destructive living conditions remains distinct from proving the specific intent to destroy the protected group. It also distinguishes between necessity and proportionality in self-defense and the rules governing the protection of civilians, while examining the duty to prevent as an independent obligation requiring due diligence. South Africa’s standing is grounded in obligations owed to all parties to the Convention, with jurisdiction remaining subject to Article IX. The study addresses the jurisdictional objection raised in Israel’s Counter-Memorial dated March 12, 2026—without treating the delay as automatic grounds for dismissal—as well as the three orders for provisional measures and the interventions of third states. The research concludes that these orders provide urgent judicial protection without conclusively determining that genocide has occurred, and that the effectiveness of such protection depends on compliance, implementation, international cooperation, and guarantees of non-repetition.