This study examines the oversight bodies within Iraqi legislation and the nature of the relationships between them. It outlines the types of these bodies, their legal competencies, and their roles in overseeing state institutions, protecting public funds, and combating administrative and financial corruption. The research is significant due to the multiplicity of oversight bodies in the Iraqi legal system; oversight functions are distributed among entities with a judicial nature—such as the Commission of Integrity and Illicit Gain and the Public Prosecution—and specialized oversight bodies like the Board of Supreme Audit, in addition to parliamentary oversight. This necessitates an examination of the relationships connecting these bodies and the extent to which they achieve complementary oversight. The research problem lies in the fact that the multiplicity of oversight bodies can, in practice, lead to overlapping competencies and procedures, potentially undermining the effectiveness of oversight operations—despite the existence of legal provisions mandating cooperation and information exchange among them. The study aims to identify the types of oversight bodies in Iraqi legislation, analyze their competencies, and elucidate the nature of the legal and organizational relationships between them. It employs an analytical approach, examining the legal provisions governing these bodies and analyzing their coherence in achieving oversight objectives. The study concludes that while a multiplicity of oversight bodies is essential for effective oversight, achieving the desired outcome requires enhanced coordination and cooperation to prevent jurisdictional overlap and ensure complementarity in the protection of public funds.