This research examines the issue of weak mechanisms for the enforcement of constitutional rulings in Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon. It does so by analyzing legal texts, scholarly jurisprudence, and decisions issued by constitutional judicial bodies, within the context of the nature of judicial review and its connection to the concepts of constitutional supremacy and the protection of rights and freedoms. Constitutional oversight has evolved through various historical stages, eventually becoming a specialized form of judicial review aimed at ensuring the constitutionality of laws and upholding the principle of legality. The challenges diminish the capacity of constitutional judicial bodies to fulfill their role as guardians of the constitution and guarantors of rights and freedoms. This raises questions regarding the overall effectiveness of judicial review in these three countries and underscores the need to reform existing mechanisms in a manner consistent with the philosophy of constitutional supremacy. The study reveals that constitutional ambiguity is not an isolated flaw unique to a single country, but rather a common feature across Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon—though its specific manifestations vary from one state to another. In Iraq, this manifested in the dispute over the interpretation of the phrase "the largest parliamentary bloc," as well as in jurisdictional conflicts between federal and regional authorities regarding water distribution. In Egypt, it stemmed from the absence of an explicit provision designating the body authorized to provide interpretations—a situation that persisted until the enactment of the 1979 law on the Supreme Constitutional Court. In Lebanon, it arose because the constitution failed to specify an exclusive authority for interpretation, which opened the door for the three branches of government to contest this prerogative.